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At all four corners of the earth: the Balkans (Kosovo,
Bosnia), Indonesia (Moluccas, East-Timor), Africa
(Sudan), as well as the Holy Land (Nazareth), Islam and
Christianity seem to be in a position of mutual rejec-
tion. Hence, the representation, which currently pre-
vails over Europe, of a perpetual conflict. However, this
vision maintained by events that indeed highlight reli -
gious conflicts, remains in a state of partiality and par-
tialness. We thus see Islam reigning undivided over the
societies south of the Mediterranean, all the while for-
getting that in the Arab world as well as in Turkey, reli-
gious uniformity Ð currently the norm Ð does not date
back to the beginning of time. Between the 7th century,
which witnessed the warriors of Islam leaving Arabia,
and the preceding century, the relationship between
the two religions was not just conflictual. On more than
one occasion and in more than one place Christianity
would come to know unexpected recoveries.1
C h r i s t i a n i t y
a n d I s l a m :
Demography in
t h e Middle East
In order to estimate the changes in the rela-
tionship between Christianity and Islam, it is
important to banish a priori the ideologies
and the explanations while having recourse
to guides as impartial as possible. In this re-
spect, demography is a particularly efficient
tool to gage the relative variations of the two
groups by means of five processes: 1) conver-
sion of individuals, families or entire groups,
2) massacres, which remained exceptional
until the early 20th century (Armenians in the
Ottoman Empire), 3) immigration and emi-
gration, by coercion or by free choice, differ-
entiated on the basis of religion, 4) inter-mar-
riage, between Muslim men and Christian
women, which leads to a second generation
of uniquely Muslim children, and 5) birth and
death rates of different magnitude leading to
diverging rhythms of growth amongst Chris-
tians and Muslims.
The existing data demonstrate that for
Islam to be durably installed in the Arab Ori-
ent, nine long centuries were to be necessary,
from the Hegira to the end of the Mameluks. It
is thus not an instantaneous religious muta-
tion as many imagine. The conquest of souls
was accelerated by the theological and na-
tional rivalries which undermined Christianity
from within. The status that Muslims reserved
for the People of the Book had demographic
effects in the opposite sense: it allowed for
Christian communities to perpetuate them-
selves, but stimulated conversions at the
same time. The Christian nucleus which sub-
sisted to the east of the Mediterranean re-
vealed itself incompressible, which was not
the case for the Maghreb, where the dynas-
ties threatened by the Christian reconquest
(Almoravides and Almohades) and spurred
on by the zeal of neophytes, drove the last
survivors of autochthonous Christianity to
conversion. 
The native Christianities were more than
once victim to East-West confrontation,
which overwhelmed them. The shock of the
Crusades naturally opposed Christianity and
Islam but it also placed face to face the Chris-
tians of the East and Christians of the West,
who had little in common. Intimidation and
humiliation imposed by the crusaders and
their Latin clergy quickly transformed the
mistrust into a rupture. This more than two
century-long intrusion of the West was to
have after effects, one of which being the
appearance of a fundamentalist Islam mis-
trustful of difference. It imposed itself on the
Christianity of the East, reducing it in terms
of population and spiritual influence. The
spirit of the Crusades did not vanish all of the
sudden. When, in 1830, Charles X sent his
troops to tackle the coasts of North Africa,
autochthonous Christianity had been gone
since several centuries prior. Reviving the
spirit of the Crusades, half a millennium after
the fall of Acre (1291) the monarch still re-
tained the objective of reconquest, for the
benefit of the ÔtrueÕ religion, of the ancient
lands of Christianity. The failure of the colo-
nial venture was patently obvious in terms of
religion, but paradoxically, not at all for lan-
guage: nearly 40 years after independence,
the imprint of the French language contin-
ues to become more profound. 
Because they had conquered the Christian
Balkans before the East and the Arab
Maghreb, by means of frequent marriages
with Christian, Greek, or Armenian princess-
es and ordinary women, the Ottomans ar-
rived with much experience in inter-denom-
inational dialogue. The special treatment
they reserved for Christian minorities, no-
tably in permitting them to regroup them-
selves into nations (m i l l e t), gave rise to a re-
vival Ð which was as spectacular as it was un-
expected Ð of Christianity. The Ottomans,
contrary to the generally accepted notion
that was widespread since the creation of
the first nation-states in the Balkans (Greece,
Serbia) and followed by those of the nation-
al entities in the Middle East, sought to con-
trol Ð not to denature Ð the populations of
the immense empire they had built. For the
first time since the Byzantine Empire, Chris-
tianity of the East found itself again in an im-
mense area of trade. In Anatolia, the Ot-
tomans permitted the recomposition of a
territory where Christianity had paid the
price of a religious and political anarchy, vir-
tually having disappeared. On the contrary,
under the reign of the Ottomans, the pro-
portion of Christians in Turkey (within the
current borders) and in the northern Middle
East (Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Israel, Iraq)
was tripled: from less than 7% at the end of
the Mameluk or Seldjoukide epoch to 20-
21% before World War II. Istanbul counted as
many Christians as Muslims in its 1881 cen-
sus. On the other hand, further away from
the heart of the empire, Egypt did not take
part in the re-Christianization movement.
The reasons for this exceptional rise in
Eastern Christianity up to the beginning of
the 20t h century reside in the quasi-disap-
pearance of conversions to Islam (some-
times even acting in the opposite sense, as
did the Chebab emirs in the Lebanese
mountains). It also resides in the rarefaction
of mixed marriages, and immigration of
Christians encouraged by the Ottoman lead-
ers from the Balkans or even Western Europe
towards Arab or Turkish cities (Aleppo or Is-
tanbul, for example). Still more decisive was
the differential demographic growth which
worked in favour of the Christians: stronger
stability of marriage favouring greater pro-
creation, a phenomenon which seems to go
back far in time, for the 9t h-century writer Al
Jahiz had already noted that thanks to their
monogamy the Christians Ôfilled the earthÕ.
In Lebanon and in Turkey, censuses attest
the superiority of the Christian birth rate. In
turn, the differences in mortality increased
the gap between the two religious groups,
the Christians being traditionally exempt
from military service, whose duration was re-
duced to 12 years of service only in 1812. The
hundreds of armed conflicts in Ottoman his-
tory accentuated an exceptionally high
death rate among Muslims, who were al-
ready vulnerable in times of peace. Epi-
demics, indeed, were far more lethal
amongst Muslims than Christians, due to dif-
ferences in the practices implemented to
deal with them. Lastly, the development of
training and modern medicine, both linked
to the institutions of the m i l l e t, would con-
tribute to the relatively early decrease in
mortality amongst Christians.
The end of the Ottoman Empire strongly
marks the end of Christianity in its Turkish
component and its decline or eclipse in its
Arab component. In the Ottoman Empire, or
more precisely, under the Young Turks and
then under the Kemalist Republic, nearly
3 million Christians were to pay the shock of
nationalisms and the birth of modern Turkey
with their lives or by their exile. There were
1.2 million Armenians in 1914 and only
7 7 thousand left in 1927; 1.5 million Greeks
before the 1914-1918 war, of which only 136
thousand were to survive in Istanbul and just
10 thousand in Anatolia 13 years later. In the
Arab world, on the other hand, it was not
massacres or exile but rather a differential
demography that was to mark the receding
numbers of Christians. The proportion of
Christians within the total population had
culminated around 1914 with 26% in the
whole of the Near East: 59% in Lebanon
(Greater Lebanon), 11% in Palestine, 10% in
Syria, 8% in Egypt and 2% in Iraq. Today,
Christians have fallen below 10% (9.2 % in
1995): 40% in Lebanon, 6.4% in Syria, 5.9% in
Egypt, 3.8% in Palestine (West Bank of Jor-
dan, East Jerusalem and Gaza), 2% in Israel,
1.5% in Iraq. This spectacular drop which
brings Christianity back to the pre-Ottoman
era owes nothing to conversions, which re-
main extremely rare, or to forced population
displacement, nor to massacres (apart from
such cases as the Nestorians and Chaldeans
in Iraq in 1933 and in Lebanon from 1975-
1990 where all the communities paid a com-
mon toll with human lives). It does perhaps
have a little to do with mixed marriages. The
international migrations, on the other hand,
contributed to a strong recomposition of the
population: long-distance emigration to-
wards America, Africa or Australia of Christ-
ian populations Ð more than that of Muslims.
From a regional point of view, the emigra-
tion of Christian Egyptians, Syrians, Palestini-
ans, and Iraqis to Lebanon, where Christians
were well represented, accelerated the re-
duction of their presence in the countries of
departure, all the while allowing Lebanon to
conserve an important Christian minority.
However, it was principally the trends in fer-
tility, reversed in disfavour of the Christians
at the eve of the 20t h century, which were
decisive in the decrease in Christianity. Hav-
ing entered earlier than the Muslims in the
process of demographic transition and hav-
ing opted for smaller families, the Christians
would paradoxically pay the price of this
early modernization process with a decrease
in their relative numbers: a phenomenon
which worsened over the generations.
Today, however, the differences in fertility
according to religion are fading. Muslims are
entering, just the same, into the current of
demographic transition. '
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Christianity of the East by Rite and Country (in thousands) 1995
C h u r c h E g y p t L e b a n o n S y r i a I r a q J o r d a n I s r a e l P a l e s t i n e T u r k e y A l l
countries
Copt (all rites) 3 2 3 8 . 9 1 . 9 0 . 0 1 . 8 1 . 2 0 . 8 2 . 8 0 . 0 3 2 9 8 . 0
Greek Orthodox 4 . 4 2 9 4 . 8 5 0 3 . 0 0 . 8 8 1 . 4 3 3 . 0 4 1 . 6 1 3 . 9 9 7 2 . 9
M a r o n i t e 2 . 5 4 9 0 . 9 2 8 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 3 0 . 3 0 . 0 5 2 9 . 0
Greek Catholic 4 . 7 2 5 5 . 2 1 1 1 . 8 0 . 7 2 2 . 1 4 3 . 9 4 . 4 0 . 0 4 4 2 . 8
Armenian Apostolic 7 . 6 1 9 6 . 4 1 1 1 . 8 2 5 . 0 3 . 5 1 . 3 2 . 9 6 8 . 3 4 1 6 . 8
Chaldean Catholic 0 . 5 4 . 9 6 . 7 3 9 0 . 3 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 6 . 8 4 0 9 . 2
J a c o b i t e 0 . 2 1 4 . 7 8 9 . 4 3 7 . 2 2 . 2 0 . 1 2 . 5 3 9 . 9 1 8 6 . 2
L a t i n 3 . 8 2 . 9 1 1 . 1 5 . 2 3 4 . 9 1 3 . 2 1 5 . 2 5 . 7 9 2 . 0
P r o t e s t a n t 2 0 . 9 2 0 . 2 2 0 . 1 5 . 8 4 . 4 4 . 5 4 . 8 5 . 2 8 5 . 9
Syrian Catholic 1 . 3 1 9 . 7 2 2 . 4 5 5 . 5 0 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 5 1 . 7 1 0 1 . 2
N e s t o r i a n 0 . 0 4 . 9 1 6 . 8 8 7 . 7 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 9 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 3
Armenian Catholic 0 . 6 1 9 . 7 2 4 . 6 5 . 5 0 . 4 0 . 1 0 . 3 5 . 1 5 6 . 3
Total Christian 3 3 3 6 . 4 1 3 2 6 . 2 9 4 5 . 7 6 1 5 . 5 1 5 0 . 1 1 0 4 . 3 7 6 . 2 1 4 6 . 6 6 7 0 0 . 6
Percentage in
p o p u l a t i o n 5 . 7 4 3 . 8 6 . 4 2 . 9 4 . 2 2 . 1 3 . 8 0 . 2 4 . 0
Source: Youssef Courbage and Philippe Fargues, Christians and Jews in Islam, London/New York, Tauris, 1997, p.209
